the principal flaw in Narveson's position (section one), show the inadequacy of Regan's and Jamieson's replies (section t\\Q) , and suggest the basis for a rrore cogent critique of "rational egoism" (section three). In the final section of the paper, I argue that analysis of these articles reveals the danger of enervation faced by any liberation move ment when its issues becxxne the focus of debate within an academic context. i Narveson's argument. is briefly as fol lows:
the foundation of rrorality is not, as Singer and Regan \\Quld have it, the recog nition that all anirrals have the right to equal treatment in cases in which they would. suffer evil as a result of being denied it. On the contrary, rights are based solely upon mutual agreement between "rational" agents 21 with a view toward reciprocal maximization of egoistic self-interest. Since non-human ani mals can neither assert self-interested claims as "rights" nor force from human beings the recognition of them by virtue of the power to infringe on corresponding human "rights," non-human animals have no rights. We human beings are, therefore, ''norally'' entitled to abuse animals in any way we see fit so long as such treatment does not in fringe on our own self-interest (as it might, for example, if we beat an expensive riding horse to death).
Narveson proceeds to consider the case of rrorons and children as the basis of a possible objection to his theory.
Children who are very young \\Quld seem to lack the capacity to assert self-interested claims, and alrrost all of them certainly lack the coercive power to get these claims recognized as "rights." Similarly, depending on their degree of debilitation, rrorons cannot assert claims, and though many may have the coercive power to infringe on others' "rights," they are not likely to realize that the guarantee of the recognition of their own claims as "rights" depends on not infringing on others' corresponding "rights." A "rational" egoist will, thus, have no "rational" basis for respecting the "rights" of rrorons, since the rrorons will probably not respect him/her • Narveson's implicit conclusion, therefore, is that children and rrorons, like non-human animals, have no rights. But is this a tell ing objection to the theory of rational ego ism?
Only i f children's and rroron' s lack of rights in scme way results in the diminish ment of other rational egoists' self-inter ests.
PHILOSOPHY
BElWEEN THE SPOCIES ----Peculiarly enough, however, the objec tion to rational egoism as fonnulated above does not appear to be the objection which Narveson tries to counter in his article. He is not trying to prove that the denial of rights to children and rrorons does not reduce other rational egoists' self-interests. Ra ther, he seems to be trying to prove that such a denial of rights need not involve treatment of children and rrorons which is different fran that accorded to other hurcan beings who possess rights, and precisely for the reason that it is not in the self-inter est of rational egoists to treat them differ ently.
That this is the true meaning of Narveson's response is evident fran the fact that he refers to this objection as "Singer's and Regan's argument fran marginal cases. " Singer's and Regan's point is not that deny ing children an.d rrorons rights will result in a diminution of rational egoists' self-inter ests, and is, therefore, inconsistent with their position, but that the denial of rights will lead to abuse of children and rrorons, which is rrorally wrong.
But a rational ego ist who is consistent has no reason to share this concern.
Mistreatment of children and rrorons can be of no moral concern to a ra tional egoist, unless it results in the re duction of his/her own self-interests. Such an objection, in fact, is ccmpletely irrele vant, for it is based on a moral premise that it is wrong deliberately to inflict evil--which the rational egoist explicitly rejects.
It would seem, however, that Narveson is inconsistent in his reasoning.
He seems to share Singer's and Regan's concern, as is indicated both by the fact that he attempts to refute the "arguments fran marginal cases" and by his rejection of cannibalism.
Hte seems, at one and the same time, to want to deny that there is any moral ground for rights except egoistic self-interest, and yet to protect hurcan beings who possess no rights fran the abuse which might result fran such a denial. The only way in which he can do this, without exposing himself to the charge that he provides no justification for prefer ential treatment of hurcan beings without rights as canpared to non-hurcan animals, is to try to show that although children and morons, like non-hurcan animals, have no rights, it is, nonetheless, in the self interest of rational egoists to treat them equally. Narveson would say, of course, that it is not in their self-interest to treat non-hurcan animals equally.
According to Narveson, a rational egoist will treat children ~ though they had rights, because the self-interests of ration ally egoistic parents include the self-inter ests of their children (rroronic or other wise).
Since they want their own children protected, they will respect other people's children as well.
Moreover, according to Narveson, a rational egoist has "nothing to gain from being permitted to invade the chil dren of others" (a highly questionable as sumption, as witness child migrant laborers). But what about orffums? Since these children have no parents, their abuse would not seem to diminish other rational egoists' selfinterests.
Narveson has an answer which is applicable to this case, but it is very weak:
we have an interest in the children of others being properly cared for because we don't want them growing up to be criminals or delinquents, etc.
Prestnnably, this would apply not only to children with parents but to orphans as well. It is, however, based on a highly speculative possibility which is unlikely to be decisive in determining a rational egoist's calcula tions of self-interest at any given time. Moreover, it is obvious that not all forms of abuse lead to criminal tendencies.
Narveson thinks a rational egoist will treat (adult) rrorons equally lest he not be treated equally were he to beoome a !lOron. To this "rational" argument, Narveson appends two "non-rational" bases for equal treatment of (adult) !lOrons, which would prestmably also apply to children (!lOrons or otherwise). The first is that a moron's rational rela tives may have a "sentimental interest" in his beirig treated equally.
I.t is unclear in what sense, if any, this "sentimental inter est" is a fonn of self-interest.
M::>reover, as Regan points out in his reply, it seems obvious that such sentimental interest does not always exist.
The other factor is "sen timent-generalization," the htnnan tendency to extend sympathy to members of one's own race, species, etc. it seems quite clear that this is not consistent with egoistic self-inter est.
Both Regan and Jamieson reply to Narve son's argument by trying to show that it is not necessarily true that the self-interest of rational egoists will always guarantee that children and !lOrons, though lacking rights, will be treated equally.
Regan li mits himself to the case of idiots, arguing that is unnecessary, fran the perspective of rational egoism, to accord equal treatment to all idiots in order to guarantee protection for oneself in the event that one became an idiot.
All that would be necessary is to guarantee continued equal treatment of all those who became idiots.
This leaves the door open to abuse of congenital (adult) idiots, since such abuse would in no way violate the rational egoists' self-interest. Nor will "sentimental interest," as already pointed out, guarantee equal treabnent of congenital idiots, since many of them are not the objects of such interest.
Jamieson criticizes this second argument on the grounds that a rational egoist could respond that the "epistennlogical problems" involved in detennining who is the object of sentimental interest are so severe that all idiots should be included in the "ambit of I!Orality. "
Quite apart fran the question as to whether "sentimental interest" is a fonn of self-interest, this seems to me an ex tremely quibbling, i f not patently false, objection to Regan's argument.
Nor are Jamieson's own arguments any stronger.
He asserts that the concept of egoistic self-interest is fluid, and that we, consequently, might cane to the view that idiots are "obscene I!Oral failures" who should be exterminated.
Jamieson's position is that such an alteration in a rational egoist's concept of his/her own self-interest would result in his/her fonner self-interest in favor of idiots being treated fairly being outweighed, and that the abuse of idiots would then be mandated by self-interest. It is extremely unclear, however, in what sense the extermination of idiots would serve one's self-interests.
In what way would the mere existence of idiots who are seen as "obscene I!Oral failures" involve a reduction in a rational egoist's self-interests?
Jamieson also hyp:>thesizes that a popu lation explosion could result in a view of hmnan fetuses as a threat to survival and as, therefore, contrary to one's self-interests. Were this to happen, we might resort to can nibalism for the sake of our self-interest. Anything, of course, is possible, but these "fables, " as Jamieson rightly calls them, bear I!Ore resemblance to the idle and rather paranoid speculations which underlie the dcmino theory in politics than to a cogent retort to rational egoism.
If it could be conclusively proven that it is not in the self-interest of rational egoists to treat children and I!Orons as though they had rights, this would, of course, force Narveson to accolUlt for how we can justify equal treatment in their case and not in the case of non-htnnan animals. Such a justification, I believe, could not be pro vided. Narveson would then be forced (assum ing that he would not simply adhere dogmatic ally to an inconsistent position) either to becane a p.tre rational egoist who would deny equal treabnent to children and idiots or. to extend equal treatment to non-htnnan animals as well.
But in the latter case, the doc trine of rational egoism will have canpletely collapsed as an effective guide to "l!Oraln conduct. In so far as Regan's and Jamieson"s articles push Narveson toward this Itrlloso phical dilenroa, they are valuable and worthy of philosoItrlcal attention.
As a defense of animals, however, both articles suffer fran very severe defects. I.n (oont. p. 25) I the first place, they are effective only to the extent that Narveson is inconsistent in his reasoning, i.e., is not a pure rational egoist.
To a pure rational egoist, both Regan's and Jamieson's criticisms are com pletely irrelevant.
Even granted that Narveson is inconsis tent, Regan's and Jamieson"s arguments are seriously deficient in other respects. Not only do they both ignore many of the weak nesses in Narveson's argument for equal treatment of children and idiots which I have pointed out above, but their own arguments (particularly Jamieson's) do not convincingly establish that it is not in a rational ego ist's self-interest to treat children and idiots equally.
More importantly, the very nature of their approach to the problem leaves open the possibility of justifying the continued abuse of non-human animals. By accepting the issue on Narveson' s own terms, Regan and Jamieson grant him the opportunity of trying to pro duce rrore convincing arguments fran self interest for the equal treatment of children and idiots.
Were he successful in doing this, then the continued abuse of non-human animals, which does not compranise our self interest, would be justified.
For in this case, there would be no contradiction of the principle of rational egoism in treating children and idiots--but not non-human ani mals-as though they had rights. Whether this can be done is highly questionable. The point, however, is that in leaving open this possibility, Regan's and Jamieson's arguments are defective in principle.
Finally, these arguments are objection able because they are iiJ.corrigibly species ist. This is due, once again, to the fact that both Regan and JamieSon accept. the pro blem on Narveson's own terms.
Both priloso filers argue, in effect, that it is wrong to abuse animals because it leads to unjustified abuse of human beings. [5] iii What fonn, then, would effective rebut tal to Narveson's position take? Narveson's attempt to refute the "argument fran marginal cases" reveals that he shares singer's and Regan's concern lest children and idiots be abused, a concern which is rooted in rroral assumptions which he supposedly rejects and which are inconsistent with a pure rational egoism.
In order to avoid the charge of a further inconsistency, i.e., the granting of equal treatment to "rightless" humans but not to "rightless" non-human animals, he defends such treatment on the grounds of rational self-interest.
Yet, his rrotivation, as have tried to make clear, is not to avoid compranising human self-interest by treating children and idiots differently, but to en sure their equal treatment without at the same time compranising the principle of ra tional egoism.
Nlarveson is inconsistent in" attempting to prevent the abuse of children and idiots for non-rationally egoistic rea sons, but consistent in utilizing rationally egoistic arguments to prevent such abuse.
His concern for children and idiots, however, arrounts to an acknowledgement of the validity of the principle of. equality with regard to the treatment of human beings. Consequently, he is open to the charge of unjustified preferential treatment of human beings in spite of the fact that he uses arguments from self-interest to support it. Egoistic self-interest is not the true ground for preferential treatment of "rightless" humans. This is the major weakness in Narve son's argument, which both Regan and Jamieson ignore. Narveson is obliged either to become a pure rational egoist, for whom equal treat ment of children and idiots is a concern only insofar as it furthers his self-interests, or to explain why the principle of equality, which is applied to "rightless" humans, is not also applied to non-human animals. iv A profOlmder lesson, however, emerges from the consideration of these essays, name ly, a recognition of the dangers to which liberation rrovements are subject when their ideological foundations become the topic of intellectual and scholarly debate within the academic cammmity.
Aziimal rights advocates may rightly applaud the increasing interest of the academic world in the prilosoprical issues raised by animal rights, but they should never forget that in terms of the goal which they espouse--the alleviation of animal suffering-such interest is justified only to the extent that it contributes to enlightened. attitooes toward non-human animals and effec tive political action on their behalf. This is not to say, of course, that they should simply ignore or reject prilosoprical argu roonts which run counter to the interests of non-human animals, nor that they should un =itically accept arguments which sUpp:Jrt animal rights. But it is essential that they learn to recognize their enemies.
There is sanething lTDrally abominable about the "ob jective" debates on lTDral issues which often take place in a university context, when a propelling sense of lTDral outrage is altoge ther lacking.
A controlled sense of lTDral outrage is the absolutely indispensable pre requisite for keeping one's true lTDral goals in view; it is not equivalent to naive or dogmatic eITDtional fervor or fanaticism.
Where this lTDral outrage is lacking, there is a serious danger of gratuitous, destructive scepticism which is often justi fied on the grounds of intellectual curiosi ty, but which aITDunts to nothing lTDre than lTDral capriciousness and intellectual clever ness.
To such scepticism the same objection can be made as is rightly made to animal experimenters who justify the torture of animals on the grounds that it extends the sfhere of human knowledge, even where such knowledge has no relevance whatsoever to the alleviation of suffering. This objection is that compassion must always preempt curiosi ty.
The extension of human knowledge, where no reduction of suffering results, may be a good (although I am inclined to think it ranks very low on the scale of goods) , but knowledge gained at the expense of the in fliction of suffering is, to my mind, quite clearly an evil.
None of this is to be construed as a denial of the urgent necessity of providing a finn, theoretical foundation for the animal rights nnvement. The attempt to do so neces sarily involves an unbiased and rigorous critical assessment not only of opposing arguments, but also of those which favor animal rights.
Nor should we dogmatically assume that opp:Jsing arguments or =itiques of pro-animal rights arguments are lTDtivated by speciesism. A fhilosofher who is impelled by lTDral concern for non-human animals may render a valuable service by exposing weak nesses in arguments which are uncritically accepted.
In a world, however, in which millions of non-human animals die annually in factory fanns and experimental laboratories in the U.S. alone, it is lTDrally repugnant to see fhilosofhers engaging in gratuitous de bates on highly technical and pragmatically irrelevant aspects of the lTDral issue of animal rights, or sowing the seeds of doubt concerning the justifiability of human treat ment of non-human animals for no other reason than idle curiosity.
Such scholarly efforts serve only to drain liberation nnvements of their life-blood, and i f not actually imnor aI, are at least utterly devoid of all re deeming lTDral conviction.
'!here may, however, be another lTDtiva tion for such efforts.
A fundamental error which often lies at the root of such efforts is the belief that all legitimate lTDral con victions are susceptible of absolute rational justification and that without such justifi cation they are worthless.
I am convinced, on the contrary, that there are fundamental lTDral intuitions which cannot be intellec tually validated in a definitive way.
When we become obsessed with intellectual "proofs" of lTDral p:Jsitions, we are in danger of be coming deaf to the unequivocal outcry of lTDral outrage and the testiITDny of our unam biguous lTDral intuitions.
Such intuitions and outrage, of course,. must always be brought before the court of reason, and where reason judges sane incoher ent "'r clearly false, they should be rejec ted. But the incap:icity of reason to prove a p:Jsition does not prove it wrong. [6] The dangers outlined above are lurking in the articles discussed here, p:irticularly in those of Narveson and Jamieson.
Let us recall Narveson's justification for develop ing his theory of "rational egoism." He does so, he says, not "because I am convinced that Singer et. ale are wrong.
I hope it is because I am not convinced that they are right."
This looks suspiciously like a ccm bination of the intellectual curiosity and ----unbridled faith in reason criticized above. For it is clear fran his article that Narve son has a great deal of sympathy for non human animals.
His sumnary of the "Regan Singer !=Osition" reads m:>re like a sympathe tic endorsement of that !=Osition--at least with regard to the factual abuses perpetrated on non-human animals--than a neutral, objec tive des=iption of it. This is sup!=Orted by other canments scattered throughout the arti cle, e.g., the rejection of the argument that factory faun animals are better off for hav ing been granted the chance to exist, the reference to rational egoism as a "nasty doctrine," and so forth.
Assuming such a concern on Narveson's part, one might well ask why, if he is simply troubled by the ultimate cogency of Singer's and Regan's !=Osition, he does not address himself to exposing the weaknesses he finds in it.
Rather than this, he develops the "nasty doctrine" of rational egoism, a doc trine which, as we have seen, he cannot bring himself to endorse whole-heartedly.
How could the developnent of a theory which to tally excludes non-htnnan animals fran IlOral consideration !=Ossibly be construed as an effective means of resolving his lingering doubts concerning the plausibility of Sing erGs and Regan's !=Osition? It would seem, on ·the contrary, to be a gratuitous exercise in destructive scepticism, which in no way ser ves the interest which (I hope) Narveson shares with Singer and Regan.
1. would sug gest that the IlOtivation for such an under taking may well have been the intellectual curiosity and unbridled faith in reason dis cussed above.
Jamieson. (and to a much less degree, Regan) sucCLUTIb in their articles to the same m:>rally counter-productive temptations. This is evident fran the fact that they accept Narveson's forrm.l1ation of the problem as the starting !=Oint of their criticism.
As a consequence, they argue their cases in a thoroughly speciesist way and canpletely ignore the principal flaw in Narveson's argu ment, the exposure of which would be the primary means of protecting the rights of animals.
Thus, when Jamieson concludes his essay by saying that "because it is a bad m:>ral theory, rational egoism fails to pro vide a solid basis for a principled indiffer ence to the sufferings of aninals," he is certainly correct, but not at all in the way that he imagines.
Rational egoism is a "bad m:>ral theory," not because the equal treat ment of children and idiots cannot be guaran teed by considerations of egoistic self interest, but because the exclusion of non htnnan animals from ethical consideration is a 6. I would argue that the opposite is also true: the incapacity of reason to dis prove a !=Osition does not prove it right.-
